

































































We study how independent directors behaviour and personal characteristics affects CEO                     
turnover as well as firm performance. The likelihood for him to be replaced after poor firm                               
performance and what impact board diversity has on firm performance. The two main board                           
characteristics studied in this thesis is experienced and how diversified the board is. The                           
experience measure has two main components, both an age threshold and a dummy variable                           
capturing involvement in multiple boards. We measure diversity within the board by three                         
factors; gender, nationality and number of independent directors. Two versions of the                       
diversity measure are included in our specifications, one less strict than the other. 
We find a negative significant relationship between older independent directors and CEO                       
turnover. We find no statistically significant results for earlier firm performance on CEO                         
turnover. However, we find a significant result with the less strict board diversity measure to                             





This thesis focuses on four main parts; independent directors characteristics, firm                     
performance, CEO turnovers and board diversity. We investigate what effect a board with                         
experienced and talented independent directors have on CEO turnover as well as firm                         
performance.  
We study how earlier firm performance affects the CEO turnover. Another hypothesis studied                         
are how diversity in the boardroom affects how well the company is performing. The thesis is                               











The role of independent directors has been a central theme in corporate board governance                           
research and there have been numerous studies investigating independent directors behaviour                     
in the boardroom and their ability to monitor the CEO. 
  
Weisbach (1988) discovered that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is                         
higher for firms with more effective board monitoring. 
Independent directors have an incentive to monitor intensively in order to maintain their                         
reputation as effective monitors within the director labour market. Independent directors tend                       
to resign from poorly performing firms or put less effort into firm directorships they view as                               
less desirable. Directors in less successful firms are hurting their reputation and are less likely                             
to become directors on other boards (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990 & Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).   
   
Masulis and Mobbs (2014) document that busy independent directors do not give an equal                           
priority to the boards and they are forced to prioritize due to their limited time and energy.                                 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) explain that busy directors holding multiple outside directorships                       
have limited time and energy they can spend at each directorship. A busy director could harm                               
small newly started firms because these firms often experience uncertainty and growth                       
resulting in increasing decision­making. These firms require much of the director’s attention                       
(Field, Lowry & Mkrtchyan, 2013). 
  
The CEO can experience forced or unforced turnover. One of the most important decisions                           
that can be taken on the board is when the directors stand united with a majority in the                                   
purpose to fire the CEO. (Guo & Masulis, 2015). According to Steven, Kaplan and Minton                             
(2011) the CEO faces a forced turnover, mainly if he is not a good fit for the firm, if he                                       
performs poorly, lacks of effectiveness, makes too few appropriate decisions, if the company                         
performs poorly or if he is fired after a downward trend in the stock price. Besides forced                                 





A well­debated issue in the boardroom facing managers, directors and shareholders is the                         
homogenous composition of directors. Gender, nationality and cultural of directors is often                       
the same. Firms have recently started to support board diversity since it improves firm                           
performance.  (Brancato, 1999; Carter et al., 2003; Mattis, 2000) 
 
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) also report one of the first results with a positive                             
correlation between the fraction of women or minorities and firm value. They also find that                             
the number of women and minorities increases with board size and firm size. The presence of                               
















Raheja (2005) explains that non­independent directors are assumed to posses a greater                       
knowledge than independent directors about the firm projects, which result in a more effective                           
decision­making in the boardroom. This scenario holds if we assume that independent                       
director’s information is costly, which it most certain is. 
It is difficult to determine whether board independence is effective or not. Adams and Ferreira                             
(2007) have questioned this and in fact Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Bolton 2009;                             
Randøy and Jensen, 2004 have observed negative effects of board independence on firm                         
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performance. Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that a larger amount of independent directors                         
sitting in the board can be sub­optimal for the company if the CEO is not willing to share                                   
information.  
   
Another interesting fact documented by Bhagat and Bolton (2008) is that CEO turnover                         
increases with a larger number of independent directors on the board. Randøy and Jensen,                           
(2004) examines the Swedish market and find a negative relationship between Tobin’s Q and                           
greater board independence for companies operating in highly competitive industries and the                       
opposite for companies operating in less competitive industries. They introduce the idea of                         
competitive environment as a tool for board monitoring.  
Duchin et al. (2010) study US markets and concludes that board independence improve firm                           
performance for firms with lower information cost and reduce firm performance for firms                         
with higher information cost. For the firms with low information cost, greater board                         
independence benefits the shareholders (Laux, 2008). Mette Lausten (2002) finds that firm                       
performance is positively correlated to CEO turnovers, this study is highly relevant for us,                           
since Denmark is a Scandinavian country and applies similar rules. 
  
Several studies have tested the effect of board independence to firm performance. The overall                           
result is that board independence has a negative or no effect at all. Studies such as; Hermalin                                 





The chairman plays the role as the head of the board and the CEO is the main representative                                   
of the firm. The CEO is responsible to take care of the on­going management. (Swedish                             
corporate governance code, 2015)  
Kaplan and Minton (2011) claim that CEO turnovers can be divided into two categories. The                             
first one is a result of external factors such as takeovers or following bankruptcy, also called                               
nonstandard. The second one depends on internal or standard factors and is board driven. The                             
first mentioned type affects mostly factors related to mergers and acquisitions, and less to                           
bankruptcy. When a takeover occurs it does not have to mean that the CEO has to quit, they                                   
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might actually consider the CEO of the former company to have the required ability. However                             
during bankruptcy the CEO often have no other option than to quit working in the firm.  
  
Internal factors of CEO turnovers are more relevant to our thesis. The board driven factors of                               
CEO turnovers can be divided into two parts, forced and voluntary turnovers, both are                           
sensitive to poor stock performance. Forced departures are often associated to bad firm                         
performance or to bad performance by the CEO. Unforced turnovers are often a result of                             
retirement or a voluntary resign of the CEO. (Kaplan and Minton, 2011) According to Jenter                             
and Lewellen (2010) the most common situation for turnovers are the internal ones, it is an                               





The result by Laux (2008) tells us that greater board independence leads to more CEO                             
turnovers, and those turnovers may in many cases be consequences of bad performance by the                             
CEO. The fact that CEO turnover is common when there are more independent directors on                             
the board is an argument that monitoring the CEO is more effective with more independent                             
boards. It can be viewed as a result of the greater objective behaviour of independent                             
directors. 
Independent directors provide more intensive internal monitoring, independent directors who                   
have a reputation of being effective monitors are often recruited to multiple directorships. 
The experience they possess by the involvement in multiple boards, makes them aware of                           
how to act when experiencing difficult decisions. (Guo & Masulis, 2015). An earlier study by                             
Laux (2008) also implies that an independent board does not necessarily leads to an improved                             
corporate governance structure. 
 
The CEO’s position is more threatened when the board is more independent. The probability                           
for the CEO to be dismissed increases with more independent directors on the board. This can                               
be explained that less independent boards are more ineffective in monitoring the CEO                         
(Weisbach, 1988). It is documented by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) that when the CEO                           
sits on the nominating committee, he appoints fewer independent directors to the board. This                           
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strengthens the earlier reasoning about the CEO feeling threatened. The CEO’s involvement                       
in the nomination process reduces the monitoring effectiveness (Guo and Masulis, 2015). 
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that a suitable way to evaluate the board's overall                           
effectiveness is to study the quality of the CEO turnover decisions. Hermalin (2005) states                           
that among the few decisions that are made in a firm where boards plays a significant role                                 
“are decisions about monitoring, pertaining to the selection or the dismissal of the CEO.” 
Jenter and Kanaan (2015) explains that one of the most important decision that the directors                             
on the board are aimed to take concerns whether to retain or fire the CEO during or after a bad                                       
stock price shifting, or if the CEO’s performance do not match with the expectations of the                               
shareholders. Guo and Masulis (2015) observe that when the board and the nominating                         
committee become more independent, the sensitivity against CEO turnover increases. Guo                     
and Masulis (2015) also states that CEO turnover to firm performance are higher for the firms                               
created prior to the new code, they have less independent boards and a CEO on the                               
nominating committee. 
 
We discovered some interesting changes of rules regarding board governance in USA, which                         
is worth mentioning. After the new reforms of board governance, the board and the                           
nominating committee is required to have a majority of independent directors. This reform                         
made boards compliant to the nominating committees, which in turn leads to a significant rise                             
in CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance. The reforms demanded that compensation                       
and audit committees had to be fully independent. This on the other hand does not have any                                 





Tiaa­Cref (1997) considers boards to benefit from qualified individuals who reflect diversity                       
of gender, race, experience and age. National Association of Corporate Directors (1994) state                         
similarly, that during the selection process for directors, their gender, racial, age and national                           
diversity should been taken into account. Sun Oil’s CEO, Robert Campbell state, “the                         
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presence of a woman or minority group on the board might have positive impact with their                               
different perspectives” ​Campbell (1996) 
Robinson and Dechant (1997) discovered positive effects of board diversity. Diversity                     
provides the board with a better understanding of the market environment, improves the                         
creativity and innovation. Last of all it increases the effectiveness of problem­solving and                         
corporate leadership and it promotes the global relationships (Robinson and Dechant, 1997),                       
(Ibarra, 1992, 1993) & (Fondas, 2000) 
 
Cox and Blake (1991) argue that firms might face substantial losses if they do not succeed                               
with their integration of diverse workforce.  
Negative aspects of board diversity are documented as well. Previous evidence on board                         
composition to firm performance will be discussed below. Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997)                         
find that a higher percentage of women on the board decreased firm performance. Zahra and                             
Stanton (1988) investigated the percentage of ethnic minority directors but did not document                         
any statistically significant result. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) find a statistically                       
significant positive relationship between the presence of women and minorities on the board                         
to firm performance.  
Baysinger and Butler (1985) state that board independence improves firm performance but the                         
optimal board composition is with both independent and non­independent directors. Against                     
it, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) did not record any significant results at all and Yermack                             





This is about parts of the Swedish code for board governance (2015) that is for our interest.                                 
and it was recently updated (1 nov, 2015). The objective of the code is to ensure that the                                   





The code put a lot of effort on board composition, the duty of the management and members                                 
of the board. The rules of the code demand firms to have at least 50 % independent directors                                   
on the board. This is of importance since it has a huge affect on the board voting balance. The                                     
code consists of guidelines for the committees (audit, remuneration and nomination). As                       
explained by the code, a majority on the nominating committee have to be independent,                           
whereas the audit and remuneration committees must solely consist of independent directors.  
  
The code states that independent directors do not have any sort of relation with the firm or its                                   
management. At least two of the members have to be independent with the company's larger                             
shareholders, which means that the larger shareholders are able to appoint members that they                           
have a relation to. To be classified as a larger shareholder you have to hold at least 10 %                                     
ownership or voting rights. There are no restrictions for the number of outside directorships                           
for the independent director to hold (Swedish code for corporate governance ,2015).  
 
The CEO can be a part of the board but cannot take the position as the chairman. Regardless if                                     
the CEO is a board member or not he is allowed to take part of the meetings unless in certain                                       
cases where the board decides otherwise. The CEO is constrained to a limited amount of                             
outside directorships unlike the independent directors. First of all, the CEO has to seek                           





Boards usually consist of people with the knowledge that is required for effective monitoring                           
and decision­making. (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). The non­independent director’s careers are                     
correlated with the CEO’s and therefore they monitor less than the independent directors                         
(Hermalin, 2005). 
  
Independent directors are seen as more effective since they monitor more intensively and are                           
particularly aware of their reputation. The independent directors talent is based on the total                           
amount of holding outside directorships a certain time. A director holding multiple                       
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directorships at the same time and still manage to give the required amount of attention to all                                 
his directorships is a sign of talent. (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). 
  
If a firm perform poorly, the CEO’s chance to stay reduces with more independent directors                             
on the board (Guo & Masulis, 2015). Another effect is that the independent directors put less                               
focus on the less performing firms, because they want to protect their reputation (Masulis &                             
Mobbs, 2014). The greatest motivation for independent directors is to keep and enhance their                           
own reputation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Reputation is based on the firm size, given that larger                               
firms afford greater visibility for the directors. The directors strive to gain reputation as                           
talented monitors, which affect their value of human capital (Fama, 1980). 
   
Board independence generally leads to improved firm performance (Laux, 2008). If                     
independent directors are more talented, they tend to have a better judgment, which will have                             
a positive effect on firm performance (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). With this in mind we argue                               
that an independent director who is more talented and experienced, has a positive impact on                             
the firm. Prior research finds several factors that can affect a director’s ability to behave                             
objectively and provide a reliable monitoring, based on social connections to the CEO                         
(Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). Independent directors tend to be more objective when it comes to                             
voting in the board due to the less personal relationship with the CEOs and thanks to                               
experience they have a better view of how the company should be operated (​Magilke,                           
Mayhew & Pike, 2009). ​If the independent directors believe that the CEO did not perform as                               
expected they are more likely to vote for a dismissal of the CEO. If independent directors tend                                 
to be more talented and experienced, it is more likely for them to know what to expect of the                                     
CEO. In other words, the pressure for the CEO to perform increases (Guo & Masulis, 2015). 
 
Diversity in the boardroom is a current trend, where boards shift to include more women and                               
ethnic minorities (Hillman et al. 2002) The Scandinavian countries are putting effort into                         
making the boards more diversified. The latest reform in Norway can confirm this, it requires                             
boards to have at least 40 % women in the boardroom. Spain applies a similar rule with a                                   
quota of women in the board. (Rose, 2007). Adams and Ferreira, (2009) argue that boards                             










The competence of a firm’s directors plays an important role and has an impact on firm                               
performance. The competence of the directors depends on their ability to monitor and advise                           
the management of the company. Directors holding multiple outside directorships are seen as                         
talented, since it requires a lot of effort to manage it. (Shivdasani & Yermack, (1999); Ferris                               
et al. (2003). 
 
However, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) have criticised this result and they found that boards                           
with busy directors experience a decline in firm performance and less effective monitoring of                           
CEO. The negative effect is a result of the time constraint that the busy directors face. Busy                                 
directors have limited time and energy and as a result they face a dilemma how to allocate                                 
their attention to the boards they are involved in. Directors tend to give more attention to                               
firms seen as more prestigious. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that larger firms are more                             
prestigious and that holding directorships in such firms is therefore characterized with a                         
higher reputation value (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also reports that                           
busy directors problem is the insufficient time to fulfil their duties.  
 
The study by Masulis and Mobbs (2014) also shows that many talented ­ that is to say ­ busy                                     
directors have strong incentives to gain reputation in the director’s labour market. This                         
reputation incentive is a strong motivation for independent directors to strengthen their                       
monitoring of the CEO. However, all directors are people with different experiences, personal                         
preferences and therefore different incentives. This can explain why some studies such as                         





Hypothesis 2: The board is more likely to face a CEO turnover after poor firm                             
performance. 
  
Schmidt et al. (1985) as well as Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that prior performance by the                                 
CEO has an increasing effect on CEO turnover. In addition, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)                           
find that in boards with a higher proportion of independent directors, are more CEO turnover                             
sensitive to firm performance. ​Firing a CEO is one of the hardest and most important                             
decisions made by the board. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that one way of evaluating                             
how effectively a board is monitored is by looking at the board's CEO turnover decision.  
Dikolli et. al (2014) report that the CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance declines                           
over the course of his employment as the CEO. Newly elected CEOs are more likely to be                                 
replaced as a result of earlier negative performance. (Mayew, Dikolli & Nanda, 2013) 
As our hypothesis states, the CEO is more likely to leave the company after a poor firm                                 





















Tiaa­cref, (1997) reports that a diversified board can have many benefits, such as to be a more                                 
effective decision maker. A diversified board should have members with a range of different                           
personal characteristics, which leads to a diversity in leadership, thinking and also                       
risk­management. A board that is racial and gender diverse signals that the firm is more                             
adaptable to diverse markets and especially if the firm operates in a global market. A diverse                               
board may understand the market and be able to provide effective and good advisements to                             
the management of the firms. (Fondas, 2000). Diversity in the boardroom also reduces the                           
















We use board data for publicly traded Swedish firms listed in Stockholm stock exchange                           
market, for the years 2006 to 2011. The data consists of individual director information for the                               
Stockholm stock exchange market, with 10315 director­firm­year­observations ​. Table 1                 1
presents summary statistics of board structure data ​. A director is seen as independent if he is                               2













We use director’s age as a proxy for the level of experience. An older director usually                               
possesses greater wisdom of life and is therefore seen as more experienced. However age                           
alone is not a good measure of experience. Even if a director is old enough to be viewed as                                     
experienced he still might be serving in a board for the first time. 
Another sign of experience is when a director is holding multiple outside directorships at the                             
same time. When we combine both age and outside directorships we have created a useful                             
interpretation of experience.   
This variable is called old and is a dummy variable with a threshold of directors older than 54                                   
years. The variable is also included in percentage form, capturing the percentage of                         
independent directors within the board at the age of 54 or older. 
We use a dummy variable for directors holding outside directorships, this variable is also                           
included in percentage form. Interpreted as the percentage of independent board members                       
holding outside directorships. The measure of holding outside directorships can be viewed as                         
both a measure of talent and business.  
We combine the two variables and call it experienced and are a dummy with the threshold of                                 
directors older than 54 who hold outside directorships. In similar fashion we also use this                             
variable in percentage form, interpreted as the percentage of independent directors within the                         
board who is older than 54 and hold outside directorships. The merge of the two variables are                                 














As earlier mentioned both the age and outside directorship variables are combined to a                           
dummy variable including two thresholds. This dummy is our actual measure of talent and                           
experience.  
Based on Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) we have come to the conclusion that when you are                               
involved in multiple boards during the same period it is a signal of talent. Talent is based on                                   
the fact that a lot of firms want you to sit in their board. Outside directorships are related to                                     
both reputation and skill. To be able to serve in multiple boards and be able to monitor                                 
effectively is a sign of talent. 
However, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) suggest that talented directors holding multiple                     
directorships at the same time have time and energy constraints, which might lower their                           
ability in monitoring and counselling. A consequence of less monitoring is lower sensitivity                         
of CEO turnover to firm performance. The issue of “over boarded” directors, defined as a                             





Following Carter et al. (2003) we define board diversity by the number and percentage of                             
minorities serving in the board. The minorities we use are females and foreigners.   
A higher percentage of these types of directors in the board contribute to more diversity and                               
spread of directors with different backgrounds and perspectives, which we believe is valuable                         
(Erhardt et al. 2003). Carter et al. (2003) use the two minority groups (females and foreigners)                               
separately to investigate the effect on firm performance. However in our report we combine                           
these two measures and create a dummy variable including a threshold. The dummy variable                           
is equal to one if the board is diverse and zero otherwise. We also use two versions of this                                     
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measure one capturing observations where we have at least 25 % foreigners and females                           












A board's size and composition affect the director’s incentives and determines much of the                           
effectiveness of the board (Raheja, 2005). The firms in our sample differ from each other in                               
terms of firm characteristics and in order to control for these differences we created the                             
following control variables. Firm size, which is measured as net sales in logarithmic form. A                             
firm’s size might affect how prestigious that directorship is to the independent director. A                           
study by Masulis and Mobbs (2013) has shown that independent directors are more active on                             
boards in more prestigious firms.  
Leverage ratio is controlled for and computed as total debt divided by total assets. 
We use two control variables connected to the CEO, a dummy equal to one if the CEO is not                                     
sitting in the board to observe the difference in the cases where the CEO has voting power or                                   
not. Lastly we control for is the CEO ownership, computed as the total number of A and B                                   
shares owned by the CEO.  
 
“percentindependent” is the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board and                       
computed as the number of independent directors divided by board size. We find that the most                               
common distribution of directors in the boardroom was 0% independent directors and 12.84%                         
of the firms had this distribution. The second most common distribution was 50%                         
independent directors and 11.20% of the firms had this distribution. Board size, which we                           
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compute by the total number of directors sitting in the board excluding the CEO if he is not                                   
sitting in the board and including employee directors. Finally we control for the age of the                               
CEO because we might have situations where the CEO left the company as a result of                               
retirement.  
 
In terms of firm data we use the logarithm of Tobin’s Q, which is the ratio of the market value                                       
of a company’s assets divided by the replacement cost of the company’s assets. We also use                               
the lagged form of Tobin’s Q to capture earlier performance. The explanation for including                           
this variable is that a CEO turnover might happens after a poor firm performance (Jenter &                               
Lewellen, 2010). We also use this variable as dependent in our second hypothesis. Some of                             
the firms in our sample did not have data on leverage and Tobin’s Q, after the drop of                                   
















For us to able to study this hypothesis we create a dependent dummy variable “CEOturnover”                             
and two main explanatory variables, holding outside directorships and above the age of 54.                           
The controlling variables we include are CEO not sitting in the board, CEO ownership, CEO                             




We drop observations for all directors and keep only the CEOs in the sample in order to have                                   
one observation every year per firm. This drop result in 1294 firm­year observations and the                             
results showed that 31.92 % faced a CEO turnover during the time interval and that the                               















The dependent variable for this specification is CEO turnover, with the explanatory variable                         
Tobin’s Q lagged one year. We use two specifications for this model, one including all                             
directors and one where only independent directors are included.  
In this specification we control for; CEO not sitting in the board, percent independent                           























This hypothesis is focused on the effect of a diversified board. We measure diversity using                             
three factors; independent directors, female directors and directors with foreign origin.  
For independence measure we include both the number of independent directors and the                         
percentage of independent directors within the board. Our gender diversification measure                     
includes number of female directors and the percentage of female directors in the board.  
Lastly we use a measure of foreign origin in similar fashion with both the number and                               
percentage of directors with foreign origin. In order to capture this measure we had to go                               
through all our 10315 observations and manually construe each director name to be Swedish                           
or foreign. 
To observe the overall diversity within the board we compute a dummy variable consisting of                             
all our diversity measures. The dummy variable “diversified” consists of three thresholds, the                         
board must contain of at least 25 % females and 25 % foreigners. This measure is highly                                 
restricted resulting in only 108 observation, we construct a less strict measure called board                           
variety in order to obtain more observations. The board variety measure is a dummy variable                             
consisting of two thresholds, a minimum of one female and one foreign director within the                             
board. This board variety measure result in 563 observations, which is far more than the                             
previous measure. 
 
In this specification we use the controlling variables; age dispersion, lagged Tobin’s Q, CEO                           














In table 3 and 4 we can observe the two specifications related to our first hypothesis. We find                                   
no significant relationship between our explanatory variable and CEO turnover. However we                       
find a significant negative result of director's older than 54 and CEO turnover. This result                             
indicates that older independent directors are more careful monitors, it could be a sign of                             
older directors being more thoughtful and restrained when it comes to firing the CEO. We can                               
also observe a partially significant relationship between independent directors holding                   
multiple outside directorships and CEO turnover. The coefficient is positive and is indicating                         
that board with independent directors holding multiple outside directorships is experiencing                     
an increase in CEO turnover. This indicated that directors holding multiple outside                       
directorships are associated with more intensive monitoring of the CEO. However this result                         
is not credible as it is not significant enough. In addition to our hypothesis we also measure                                 
the effects of an experienced and talented independent director on firm performance measured                         
as Tobin’s Q. Here we find no significant relationship to our experience and talent measure.                             
We find however a significant result of independent directors older than 54. The coefficient is                             
negative and reveals that boards with independent directors over the age of 54 is experiencing                             
a decrease in firm performance. We believe that this is a result of older directors being more                                 
























Table 6 contains the regression results related to our third hypothesis. When looking at our                             
restricted diversity measure we can see no significant relationship to firm performance. We                         
believe this is due to too less observations. If we look at our less restrictive measure called                                 
varied board we see a significant positive relationship to firm performance. A positive                         
coefficient on this measure indicates that boards with at least one female and one foreigner                             
experience better firm performance in general. Our results is in line with reports by Carter et                               
al. 2003 and Erhardt et al. 2003 who find a positive effect of gender and racial diversity on                                   
firm performance. We believe the increase in firm performance of having gender and racial                           
diversity is a result of a more diverse board being more effective in decision making. A more                                 
diverse board is more likely to have different views and experiences hence reduce group                           
thinking and instead promote profitable discussions. Another possible reason for the increase                       
in firm performance could be that the board is more adaptable to the diverse and global                               










In this thesis we study independent directors and non­independent characteristics and what                       
impact they have on both monitoring of the CEO and firm performance. In our first                             
hypothesis we predict independent directors holding multiple outside directorships and having                     
an age suitable for a well­experienced director to have an increasing effect on CEO turnover.                             
Here we find no significant relationship between an experienced independent director and                       
CEO turnover. However, we find a highly significant negative relationship between                     
independent directors above the age of 54 and CEO turnover. This is a sign that older                               
independent directors are more sensitive monitors. More careful monitoring could be an effect                         
of older directors being more thoughtful and less impulsive when it comes to major decision                             
making such as firing the CEO. 
 
In our result we find a weak significant positive relationship between independent directors                         
holding multiple outside directorships and CEO turnover. We believe this finding is due to a                             
talented independent director have a strong incentive to maintain his reputation as an effective                           
monitor within the director labour market. Our finding is in line with Masulis and Mobbs,                             
(2014) arguments that talented independent directors reputation is a valuable asset and it gives                           
them strong incentive to maintain their reputation as effective monitors. Masulis and Mobbs,                         
(2014) also shows a positive coefficient on busy boards, however the effect is of no statistical                               
significance. 
When we test our experienced and talented approximations on firm performance, we find a                           
significant negative relationship with older independent directors on firm performance. This                     
result is harder to interpret, we suspect that older directors in some cases could be less active                                 
in the boardroom and therefore contribute to less effective board as a whole. ​When studying                             
our second hypothesis we find no statistical significance when studying the effect of earlier                           
firm performance on CEO turnover. We think the reason behind this is that earlier firm                             





We explore the effect of board diversity, adding directors from minority groups to the board.                             
In our research we set a measure of board diversity too strict resulting in too few observations.                                 
We change this measure to a less restricted measure and calling it variety in the board instead.                                 
With this measure we find a significant positive impact on firm performance. We interpret                           
this result as a board with a variety of director traits experience better firm performance. The                               
result confirms our hypothesis and shows that there is positive impact on adding minorities to                             
the board. 
Our results are similar to findings done by ​M. Ararat, M. Aksu and A. Tansel Cetin (2015)                                 










































































































































































































































































(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
 
Variables  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max   
  
CEO measures 
CEO turnover 1,294 0.154 0.361 0 1 
CEO not sitting  1.294 0.516 0.509 0 4 
On the board 
CEO ownership 1,294 1346941 48955130 4.42e+07 
CEO age 1,294 50.065 7.015 32 67 
CEO remuneration 1,158 5099206 48153790 2.85e+07 
Board data 
Board size 1,294 7.463 2.258 3 15 
Total outside 1,294 11.815 17.586 0 136 
Directorships in the board 
#Independent directors 4,411 2.038 1.733 0 10 
Independent 
Directors (%) 4,411 0.243 0.204 0 1 
Experience measures 
# Outside directorships 9,021 1.744 1.284 0 10  
Hold outside 9,021 0.346 0.287 0 1  
Directorship (%) 
Old ( age   55)≥ 9,021 4.479 2.093 0 11   
Old ( age   55) (%)≥ 9,021 0.537 0.194 0 1  
Old and hold 9,021 1.894 1.498 0 7 
outside directorship  
Old and hold 9,021 0.206 0.159 0 0.875 
Outside directorship (%) 
Diversity measures 
# Foreigners 1,241 1.088 1.315 0 8 
Foreigners (%) 1,241 0.121 0.139 0 1 
# Female directors 1,911 1.666 1.284 0 6 
Female directors (%) 1,911 0.187 0.128 0 0.667 
Board diversity 79 0.061 0.240 0 1 
Board variety 563 0.436 0.495 0 1 





















(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   
Variables  N  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
  
Tobin’s Q (ln)  1,294  5.736  1.830  0  7.166 
Firm size (ln)  1,072  14.363  2.201  4.663  19.553 






































(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
CEO not sitting in the board ­0.292** ­0.301** ­0.293** ­0.294  
(0.140) (0.144) (0.142) (0.143) 
Independent directors (%) ­0.038 ­0.009 ­0.023 ­0.032  
(0.167) (0.173) (0.170) (0.172) 
CEO ownership ­0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
CEO age 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
Board size ­0.012 ­0.011 ­0.011 ­0.012 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  
# Total outside directorships  ­0.002 ­0.002 ­0.001 ­0.001 
in the board (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 
Leverage  0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
CEO remuneration 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Firm size (ln) 0.042 0.046 0.045 0.045  
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)  
Tobin’s Q (ln) ­0.019 ­0.012 ­0.012 ­0.013 
(0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  
 Tobin’s Q (ln) Δ 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004 













Constant ­0.435 ­0.545 ­0.536 ­0.523  
(0.677) (0.700) (0.691) (0.695)  
 
Observations 698 698 698 698 
R­squared 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 
This table presents fixed­effects estimation results for a model using robust standard errors, where the dependent variable is CEO turnover                                       
computed as a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a turnover has occurred, 0 otherwise. The years are 2006­2011. The explanatory                                           
variables are; hold outside directorship computed as dummy variable equal to 1 if the director holds at least one directorship and 0 otherwise,                                             
hold outside directorship (%) computed as percentage of directors within the board holding outside directorships, old (age 55) computed as                                   ≥      
directors older than 54 years, old (age 55) (%) computed as percentage of directors older than 54 years, old and hold outside directorship               ≥                                
computed as directors older than 54 and holding outside directorships, old and hold outside directorship (%) computed as percentage of                                       
directors older than 54 and holding outside directorships. The sample used in columns (1)–(4) we use a sample of independent directors only.                                           











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
CEO not sitting in the board ­0.079 ­0.085 ­0.090 ­0.078  
(0.212) (0.218) (0.216) (0.215) 
Independent directors (%) 0.270 0.355 0.249 0.355 
(0.282) (0.269) (0.285) (0.266) 
CEO ownership 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO age ­0.16* ­0.018** ­0.017* ­0.016* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Age dispersion ­0.038 ­0.027 ­0.034 ­0.032 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Board size 0.029 0.034 0.030 0.033 
(0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
# Total outside directorships in the board ­0.005 ­0.004 ­0.004 ­0.004  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Leverage (ln) ­0.000 ­0.000 ­0.000 ­0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (ln) ­0.057 ­0.046 ­0.053 ­0.051 
(0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) 
Tobin’s Q (ln) Δ ­0.083* ­0.094* ­0.089* ­0.090* 













Constant 7.920*** 7.419*** 7.826*** 7.601***  
(0.976) (0.992) (0.972) (0.983) 
 
Observations 715 715 715 715  
R­squared 0.264 0.358 0.332 0.343  
 
This table shows estimation results for the regression fixed­effects model using robust standard errors. The dependent variable is CEO                                     
turnover computed as a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a turnover has occurred, 0 otherwise. The years are 2006­2011. The                                           
explanatory variables are; hold, computed as dummy variable equal to 1 if the director holds at least one directorship and 0 otherwise, hold                                             
outside directorship (%) computed as percentage of directors within the board holding outside directorships, old (age 55) computed as                                 ≥      
directors older than 54 years, old (age 55) (%) computed as percentage of directors older than 54 years, old and hold outside directorship               ≥                                
computed as directors older than 54 and holding outside directorships, old and hold outside directorship (%) computed as percentage of                                       












Dependent variable: CEO turnover  All directors Independent directors  
 






CEO age 0.005 0.005  
(0.007) (0.007)  
Board size 0.007 ­0.011  
(0.031) (0.025) 
# Total outside directorships ­0.001 ­0.001 




CEO remuneration 0.000* 0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size (ln) 0.034 0.045  
(0.037) (0.036) 
Tobin’s Q (ln) ­0.001 ­0.013  
(0.027) (0.025) 
Tobin’s Q (ln) Δ 0.024 0.004  
(0.026) (0.025) 
Constant ­0.709 ­0.052  
(0.708) (0.688) 
 
Observations 751 698  
R­squared 0.007 0.003  
 
This table presents fixed­effects estimation results for a model using robust standard errors, where the dependent variable is CEO turnover                                       
computed as a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a turnover has occurred, 0 otherwise. The years are 2006­2011. The explanatory                                           
variables are; Tobin’s Q and Tobin’s Q computed as Tobin’s Q in the time period, t ­ 1.We report results using the full sample. The sample           Δ                                            
used in columns (1) consists of all outside directors, regardless of their independence status. In columns (2) we use a sample of independent                                             






















(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CEO not sitting in the board 0.068 0.038 0.067 0.054
(0.171) (0.155) (0.178) (0.184)  
CEO ownership 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Board size 0.010 0.008 ­0.010 ­0.006  
(0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) 
# Total outside directorship ­0.004 ­0.003 ­0.000 ­0.002  
 in the board (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
Leverage ­0.001 ­0.001 ­0.000 ­0.000  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Firm size (ln) ­0.060 ­0.055 ­0.051 ­0.064
(0.060) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058)  
 Tobin’s Q (ln) Δ ­0.064 ­0.066 ­0.073 ­0.073 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.050) 
Age dispersion ­0.023 ­0.023 ­0.026 ­0.025 

















Constant 7.097*** 7.131*** 7.144*** 7.265***
(0.823) (0.831) (0.846) (0.866) 
 
Observations 768 768 768 768  
R­squared 0.123 0.125 0.246 0.198 
 
This table presents fixed­effects estimation results for a model using robust standard errors, where the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q                                       
computed as the total market value of the firm divided by the total asset value. The years are 2006­2011. The explanatory variables are; #                                               
independent directors computed as number of independent directors sitting in the board, # foreigners computed as number of foreigners                                     
sitting in the board, # female directors computed as number of female directors sitting in the board, independent directors (%) computed as                                           
percentage of independent directors sitting in the board, computed as the number of independent directors divided by board size, foreigners                                       
(%) computed as percentage of foreigners sitting in the board, computed as the number of foreigners divided by board size, female directors                                           
(%) computed as number of female directors sitting in the board, board diversity computed as dummy variable equal to 1 if the board consists                                               
of at least 25 % females, 25 % foreigners and 50 % independent directors, and 0 otherwise and board variety computed as dummy variable                                               
equal to 1 if the board consists of at least one foreigner and one female and 0 otherwise. The sample used in columns (1)–(4) consists of all                                                     
































  Old ( age   55)≥   Directors older than 54 years.  
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  Old ( age   55) (%)≥   Percentage of directors older than 54 years.  
Old and hold outside 
directorship  
Directors older than 54 and holding outside 
directorships.  
  Old and hold outside  
  directorship (%) 
Percentage of directors older than 54 and holding 
outside directorships.  
  Age dispersion   Standard deviation of age. 
# Independent directors  Number of independent directors sitting in the board. 
# Foreigners  Number of foreigners sitting in the board. 
# Female directors  Number of female directors sitting in the board. 
  Independent directors (%)  Percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board, computed as the number of independent 
directors divided by board size. 
Foreigners (%)  Percentage of foreigners sitting in the board, 
computed as the number of foreigners divided by 
board size.  
Female directors (%)  Percentage of female directors sitting in the board, 
computed as the number of female directors divided 
by board size.  
Board diversity   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the board consists of at 
least 25 %  females and 25 % foreigners and 0 
otherwise.   
  Board variety   Dummy variable equal to 1 if the board consists of at 
least one foreigner and one female and 0 otherwise.  
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Panel B  Firm data 
 
 
Variable  Description 
 
Tobin’s Q (ln)  A measure of firm performance computed as total 
market value of firm divided by total asset value of the 
firm, in log­form.  
 Tobin’s Q (ln) Δ   Tobin’s q lagged one year, in log­form. 
Firm size (ln)  Net sales, in log­form 
Leverage   Ratio of total debt to total assets. 
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